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2Abstract
In this article we test Putnam’s claim that online interactions are unable to foster social
capital by examining the formation of bridging and bonding social capital in online
networks. Using Burt’s (2005) concepts of closure and brokerage as indicators, we observe
networks formed through online interactions and test them against several theoretical
models. We test Putnam’s claim using Twitter data from three events: the Occupy
movement in 2011, the IF Campaign in 2013, and the Chilean Presidential Election of the
same year. Our results provide the ﬁrst evidence that online networks are able to produce
the structural features of social capital. In the case of bonding social capital, online ties are
more eﬀective in forming close networks than theory predicts. However, bridging social
capital is observed under certain conditions, for example, in the presence of organizations
and professional brokers. This latter ﬁnding provides additional evidence for the argument
that social capital follows similar patterns online and oﬄine.
Keywords: social capital, Twitter, network simulation, closure, brokerage, social
media
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Introduction
Putnam’s (2001) thesis outlining the decline of social capital in the United States
re-invigorated one of the most enduring debates and research agendas in political science
and elsewhere. His central argument, that social connections are vital for the sustainability
and stability of a democratic society, elevated social capital from the individual or group
level of analysis (1994; 2001), to an understanding of how social capital aﬀects political
institutions. His thesis has been taken up by scholars studying social capital in a variety of
national contexts (Colletta & Cullen, 2000; Bowles & Gintis, 2002; Hooghe & Stolle, 2003;
Claridge, 2004; Pinchotti & Verwimp, 2007) and has been subject to numerous revisions
and rejoinders (Sobel, 2002; Tzanakis, 2013). Twenty years on from Putnam’s initial
publication, the debate over social capital shows no sign of abating, instead taking on a
new dimension — the development of information and communication technologies (ICTs).
The explosion of ICTs has transformed inter-personal communications and,
consequently, has aﬀected the ways in which people create and maintain social connections.
In particular, social media has brought new questions to the ﬁeld of social capital and,
despite widespread interest, the literature has not always kept pace. Work in this ﬁeld has
focused primarily on understanding the role of social connections formed — or maintained
— through the Internet (Bond et al., 2012; Ellison et al., 2006; Gibson et al., 2000;
Kavanaugh & Patterson, 2001; Margetts et al., 2011; Shah et al., 2001; Wellman et al.,
2001; Williams, 2006). Most of the research assessing the relationship between these new
technologies and social capital assumes that the ties formed through online platforms carry
a similar quantity and quality of resources (i.e. social capital) to relationships formed
oﬄine; however, this assumption has not been explicitly tested.
The aim of this article is twofold. First, to test the formation of the structural
4signatures of social capital online by analyzing online social networks. Here we are
interested in the relationship between social media and social capital formation, speciﬁcally
how connections established via social media — in this case Twitter — lead to the
formation of two speciﬁc forms of social capital, bridging and bonding capital. Our test
here is explicitly structural. We examine the architecture of social networks, but not the
content or quality of the links. As such, it marks a ﬁrst and necessary test of whether there
is evidence for online social capital. Second, we consider the relative importance of
bridging and bonding capital. This is of special interest since one of the advantages of ICTs
is to connect otherwise unconnected people, suggesting we might expect to see a diﬀerent
inter-play between the two types of social capital than we see in face-to-face world
interactions.
The distinction between bonding and bridging social capital as popularized by
Putnam (2001), is one that is well-known and developed, but worth brieﬂy rehearsing here.
Bonding social capital exists in the strong ties occurring within, often homogeneous, groups
— families, friendship circles, work teams, choirs, criminal gangs, and bowling clubs, for
example. Bonding social capital acts as a social glue, building trust and norms within
groups, but also potentially increasing intolerance and distrust of out-group members.
Bridging social capital exists in the ties that link otherwise separate, often heterogeneous,
groups — so for example, individuals with ties to other groups, messengers, or more
generically the notion of brokers. Bridging social capital allows diﬀerent groups to share
and exchange information, resources, and help coordinate action across diverse interests.
Putnam emphasises that these are not either/or categories, but that in well-functioning
societies the two types or dimensions develop together.
Similar to other studies (Coleman, 1988; Shen et al., 2014), we use Burt’s (2005)
structural notion of social capital and two associated metrics, closure and brokerage, as
indicators of bonding and bridging social capital respectively. Closure refers to the level of
5connectedness between particular groups of members within a broader network and
encourages the formation of trust and collaboration. Brokerage refers to the existence of
structural holes within a network that are ’bridged’ by a particular member of the network.
Brokerage permits the transmission of information across the entire network. Social
capital, then, is comprised of the combination of these two elements, which interact over
time. We use the observed values for closure and brokerage over time and compare them
with diﬀerent simulations based on theoretical network models to show how they compare
to what we would expect oﬄine. From this, we evaluate the existence and formation of
social capital in online networks.
Using diverse-case criteria for case selection, we draw on Twitter data for three
diﬀerent events — the 2011 U.S. Occupy Movement, the UK-based IF Campaign organised
by a coalition of UK NGOs around hunger and the 2013 G8 meeting, and the 2013 Chilean
Presidential Election. We analyze the networks created by the transmission of information
from these events to identify patterns of social capital formation within/among their
structural features. Our data show that, contrary to Putnam, online networks show
evidence of social capital and these networks exhibit higher levels of closure than what
would be expected based on theoretical models. However, the presence of organizations
and professional brokers is key to the formation of bridging social capital. Similar to
traditional (oﬄine) conditions, bridging social capital in online networks does not exist
organically and requires the purposive eﬀorts of network members to connect across
diﬀerent groups. Finally, the data show that interaction between closure and brokerage
goes in the right direction, moving and growing together.
The article proceeds as follows. In the ﬁrst section we brieﬂy review the theory of
social capital and Putnam’s scepticism of online social capital. We outline the two key
indicators of online social capital used in this article, provide a brief review of the literature
on network approaches to social interactions and on the role of organizations in collective
6action. Finally, we set out four research hypotheses derived from the theoretical discussion,
and summarise the theoretical models that are used to test our hypotheses. The second
section describes the methodology used to collect and analyse the data. The third section
documents our results and provides a discussion of the main ﬁndings. The conclusion
brings the paper together and outlines fruitful directions for future research.
Theory and Hypotheses
Social Capital Online?
According to Putnam (2001), computer-mediated communication makes online
interactions unsuitable for the formation of social capital for four principal reasons. First,
face-to-face interactions carry much more contextual information than online interactions
due to the high degree of non-verbal communication that accompanies face-to-face
communication. Second, face-to-face interactions can bring diverse people together,
whereas online interactions take place among like-minded people, something he calls
’cyberbalkanisation’. Third, online interactions do not foster social capital because of a
digital divide in access to the Internet, which allows for the interaction of members of the
elite and not the public in general. Fourth, the Internet has more potential to become a
form of entertainment rather than communication. We take up each of these diﬀerences in
turn, and set out why, a priori, online interactions may indeed foster the development of
social capital.
Putnam argues that online interactions are unable to foster social capital due to the
absence of non-verbal cues and information, which form a large part of inter-personal
communications. In the case of this ﬁrst diﬀerence, we agree with Putnam: oﬄine
interactions lack this fundamental feature. However, to our knowledge, no study has
empirically shown the extent to which non-verbal communication is necessary for the
formation of social capital or social trust and cooperation that ﬂows from it. Second, with
7respect to cyberbalkanisation, recent research has shown (Brundidge & Rice, n.d.) that
Facebook groups and proﬁles allow the emergence of political discussions among people
who disagree, particularly through the connection of two persons who have a ’friend’ in
common. Moreover, research by the Pew Research Internet project has shown that only 4%
of social media users block, unfriend, or hide someone on the site because they disagreed
with something the user posted about politics (Rainie & Smith, 2012). Additionally,
research on Twitter has shown that, although people are more likely to interact with others
who share the same views as they do during discussions on controversial topics, they are
actively engaged with those with whom they disagree (Yardi & boyd, 2010). These trends
however have been observed mainly after the rise of social networking sites which, contrary
to the general use of the internet which Putnam had in mind in 2000, have speciﬁc
aﬀordances that promote socialization and interaction.
Rather than reinforce cyberbalkanisation, we argue that social media has the
potential to facilitate discussion amongst diﬀerent groups, particularly as online ties are
not bound to their immediate communities creating the possibility of communication
across traditional geographical boundaries. Online ties may facilitate communication
amongst diﬀerent individuals and groups because some of the initial barriers to
communication in oﬄine, face-to-face communication (gender, race/ethnicity, disability)
are rendered less visible.
While digital divide concerns persist, recent evidence shows a closing gap in access
(Judge et al., 2006). Moreover, oﬄine interactions do not provide any insurance for
discussions outside of elites. Other factors, such as geographical segregation, may be far
more relevant for social integration than Internet access. Finally, while some scholars
(Morozov, 2011) concur with Putnam’s assessment of the Internet’s greater potential for
entertainment than communication, there is some evidence to show the Internet’s
communicative and mobilizing forces (Ward & Gibson, 2009). This same assessment
8applies to oﬄine organisations; joining organisations is not necessarily the same as
interacting within those organizations.
In sum, we see no a priori reason(s) that social capital cannot exist online. But do
diﬀerences in the form, features or characteristics of online and oﬄine interactions produce
diﬀerent forms of social capital? We think it is plausible. For example, online ties may be
based more on the transmission of information than the personal characteristics of those
interacting, such as geographical location, gender, ethnicity, or even more importantly, who
they know. Online ties may not be as stable or durable as those created face-to-face,
because of the dynamic nature of the Internet. The level of engagement required to create
a tie online might be lower than the engagement required oﬄine, which might also have
consequences for the type of resources they can mobilise. Finally, the categorisation of
weak and strong ties as proposed by Granovetter (1973) might not operate in the same
way: the strength of an online tie may be better measured by the quantity of interactions
and the frequency and quality of the information it transmits, rather than the personal
characteristics of those making the connection.
Our aim in this article however, is not to identify whether there are diﬀerences in
online versus oﬄine social capital, but to ﬁrst establish evidence of social capital online.
Like the bowling leagues that Putnam used to illustrate social capital oﬄine, we argue that
Twitter and Facebook discussions create social networks, operating under norms of trust
and reciprocity, that are able to mobilise resources and information. In the next section we
examine the concepts of bonding and bridging social capital. Subsequently, we set out two
theoretical models of social capital in online networks and drawing on these models,
identify three hypotheses relating to the formation and structure of online networks.
9Observing Social Capital Online: Bridging and Bonding Social Capital
The concept of social capital has travelled a long way since its original inception by
Hanifan (1920), who described social capital as ‘those tangible substances that count for
most in the daily lives of people’ (1920: 130). Since then, according to Webber (2008),
there has been two streams of development of the concept: neo–capital and communitarian
theories of social capital. Neo–capitalists (e.g. Portes, 1998; Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 2005)
are concerned with the relative advantage of a person within a group, that is, how the
position of a person might bring them beneﬁts in relation to the rest of the members of the
network. This approach allows us to determine how the relationships we form are able to
mobilise resources or, as Bourdieu would prefer, how much ‘capital’ we can acquire through
our social connections. In the case of communitarian approaches, as exempliﬁed by
Putnam, they look at the aggregate beneﬁts of social connections. This approach is less
concerned about the individual gains of participating in a network and more about the
societal outcomes of them.
Within the communitarian approach, Putnam makes the distinction between bonding
and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital exists in tight-knit networks that foster
intra-group, strong ties. Putnam calls it a ‘sociological superglue’, and explains that it is
useful to build trust between the members of the group and increases the levels of
solidarity. Bonding social capital might also be responsible for creating exclusion against
those outside the group, which becomes the negative dimension of social capital. Bonding
ties are the natural result of homophily (McPherson et al., 2001), where people who share
similar relevant characteristics — such as geographical location, religion, ideology, among
others — tend to group and work together. The other dimension of social capital, bridging
ties, or the connections that people form outside their circles. This is similar to what
Granovetter (1973) called ‘weak ties’. Bridging social capital is responsible for coordinating
action across diﬀerent groups, and provides new information and resources to the more
10dense groups. Although both forms of social capital might be considered to be competing
with one another, Putnam argues that they are not ‘either/or’ categories: they operate in
coordination and are diﬀerent measurable dimensions of measure social capital. 1
To examine evidence of social capital online we take up the work of Burt (2005) who
introduces two key indicators of social capital: closure and brokerage. The latter refers to
the existence of a gap between two social groups, known as a structural hole. Brokerage
takes place when two diﬀerent groups are connected by a single node. Being a broker
allows a person to have a better overview of the network and to become the only point of
contact between two or more groups; hence, she can control the ﬂow of information and
resources through that network.
Social network structures consider the relationships built by people over time. These
relationships can be dependent on contextual elements, such as work relations or, on a
more personal level, friendship. Regardless of how we connect with others the networks we
build will have diﬀerent structures. Some networks will be denser, with everyone in the
group interacting with all of the other members (the basic deﬁnition of a cluster), while
others will require someone to bridge diﬀerent groups. The latter function of bridging is
what we call ’brokerage’.
Like Putnam, Burt (2005) argues that brokerage works in cooperation with closure
(Coleman, 1988). That is, in order to broker something between two groups, each one has
to host cohesive ties among their members, or some degree of closure. Conceptually,
closure can mean diﬀerent things depending on the network. In a group of friends, closure
might mean trust, intimacy or frequency of contacts; whereas in a group of colleagues,
1Bridging and bonding social capital may not be suﬃciently nuanced categories for characterising online
interactions, given the absence of cues that help to structure group formation in face-to-face environments.
Before developing more nuanced categories however, it is useful to determine whether traditional conceptu-
alisations are present.
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In that sense, what we understand by closure may change depending on the type of social
network we are observing. The important thing to consider is that closure allows a network
to build trust among its members, by providing a safe environment for social relations.
Hence, closure is essential for the creation of resources and information within a group,
which in turn can be mobilised by a broker to another group.
A useful example of closure provided in the literature (Christakis & Fowler, 2011) is
the dynamics of military companies. A company of 100 soldiers is usually composed of 10
groups of 10 soldiers each. It is important for the eﬃciency of the whole company that each
group of 10 becomes very close and that everyone in the groups knows each other. But
within group closure is not enough for the emergence of social capital. It is also important
that each group has ties with members of the other groups, i.e. what Granovetter (1973)
would call ’weak ties’, to transmit information and resources. Thus, it is the interplay of
closure and brokerage that provides the company with an optimal level of social capital.
As with the conjunction between closure and brokerage, the important element of
social capital refers to a collective behaviour based on trust and reciprocity. Putnam claims
that the beneﬁts of participating in voluntary associations are not only individual, but also
bring positive outcomes at a societal level. His distinction between bridging and bonding
social capital takes the brokerage and closure discussion to an aggregate level by arguing
that intra-group ties build trust and mobilise diverse resources.
From a conceptual point of view, Burt’s concepts of closure and brokerage oﬀer a
useful way of bringing the neo-capital and communitarian approaches to social capital
together. Burt provides a clear conceptual deﬁnition that ﬁts most of the elements of
Putnam’s categories, but also provides a path for rationalising them. Closure operates in
the same way as bonding social capital, favouring intragroup ties, fostering the formation
of trust and building dense communities. On the other hand, brokerage provides a fresh
12ﬂow of new information to the network, allows for the mobilisation of diﬀerent resources,
and uses the trust formed by closure to act as a tool for collective action. Our approach
here has been to demonstrate the similarity of Putnam’s bonding and bridging capital and
Burt’s closure and brokerage concepts. Thus, we employ Burt’s measures as indicators of
bonding and bridging capital at the aggregate level. A explanation of the diﬀerences
between the approaches can be found in Table 1.
Finally, the decision to use these concepts (brokerage and closure) as measures for
bonding and bridging social capital stems from the need to provide better indicators for
these concepts. Currently, measures of social capital are analysed either using social
network analysis, or survey instruments such as the name generator (McCallister &
Fischer, 1978), the position generator (Lin, 2008) and, more recently, the resource
generator (Van Der Gaag & Snijders, 2005). Some researchers (Ellison et al., 2011; Kwon
et al., 2013) have also used survey instruments to assess the presence of bonding and
bridging social capital in online platforms. In our view, this kind of exercise introduces two
sources of bias. On the one hand, the use of self-reported data may lead to a
misrepresentation of the actual networks. On the other hand, this type of data only allows
for the analysis of ego-networks (i.e. the connections of a single node), and thus excludes
the possibility of observing directly the interplay among diﬀerent social groups. This
concern has been shared by Appel et al (2014), who emphasize the lack of validity of most
survey instruments used to measure social capital in ICTs.
In their recent article, Gibson and McAllister (2013) deﬁne bridging social capital as
interacting with people from diﬀerent ethnic backgrounds, ages, or countries and bonding
social capital as interacting with family, close friends, or people with shared hobbies,
religious beliefs, or political views. Their work uses survey-based, self-reported measures of
social capital or, in other words, use ego-centric measures derived from the respondent’s
view of how he or she connects to the rest of the world. They show that only bonding
13social capital is signiﬁcantly and positively related to political participation; bridging social
capital is not correlated with political activities. We argue that the use of observed
networks provides an unbiased opportunity for analysing bonding and bridging social
capital.
We are interested in seeing whether our approach complements Gibson and
McAllister’s (2013) ﬁndings, especially since we use actual network based measures of
social capital, which they do not. Our measure is diﬀerent and is derived empirically from
the structure of the network. For us, a bridging tie is literally one that bridges between
groups and bonding ties are within group links. This means that we do not have to rely on
people’s perceptions of whether the Internet allows them to form in-group or out-group
ties; we calculate this from the actual network of ties itself. What is of interest then, is the
extent to which our results complement theirs.
The role of organizations in the investigation of online social capital
Inspired by the classic work of de Tocqueville on ’Democracy in America’ (2006),
Putnam (2001) places particular emphasis on the beneﬁts of organisational membership for
the creation of social capital. According to Putnam, organisational involvement can have
important beneﬁts for the community (and for democracy in general) by providing
organisation members with the necessary competencies for participation in public life,
fostering the creation of social capital. Most crucially, organisational involvement has been
shown to be an important antecedent not only of civic engagement and involvement in
collective action (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), but also for the maintenance and enhancement
of strong ties — especially amongst activist groups (McAdam, 1990).
Recently, the extent to which organizations are required for collective action has been
questioned. Bimber et al. (2012) argue that the presence of ’organization-less organizing’,
such as the protests against the WTO meeting in Seattle in 1999, are becoming increasingly
14common. That said, they do not ignore the role of formal organizations, noting how some
organisations have been thriving by adapting to possibilities brought by new technologies.
They argue that organisations are ﬂexible, adaptive and adopt new technologies over time.
The key diﬀerence is that organizations are no longer both a necessary and suﬃcient
condition for collective action, such as classical studies suggest (Olson, 1965).
In line with that argument, some researchers (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) propose a
new way to conceptualize collective action, which emphasizes the role of the connections
among people, rather than the fact that they come together as a collective. In their view,
collective action eﬀorts can be framed in three diﬀerent ways: 1) organizationally brokered
collective action, which contains ‘coalitions of heavily brokered relations among
organizations’ (2013: 13), namely, the role that traditional theory assigns to organizations;
2) organizationally enabled connective action, which refers to the presence of loosely tied
organizations that allow for people to personalize their engagement; and 3) crowd-enabled
connective action, where individuals connect by themselves using digital media platforms,
and organizations play a peripheral role, if any at all. There is an important distinction to
be drawn between the thinner view of connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) and
the thicker view of social capital. Connective action is merely transactional. It allows
people to organize. Social capital is transformational. It results in social externalities,
thickening the social glue of trust and shared norms. To be clear, our approach here is to
examine the social structure of connective action, which may or may not result in lasting
social capital. We do not examine the content of online ties, which would allow us to assess
the quality of the connections. We argue that our structural approach is a necessary, but
not suﬃcient, ﬁrst step to in assessing whether there is any evidence for online social
capital.
These changes pose an intriguing question about the role social media can play in the
generation of social capital in the context of diﬀerent organizational settings. Indeed, based
15on Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) typology which distinguishes between diﬀerent degrees
of organisational involvement, we hypothesize that the level of brokerage and closure
within networks of collective action should diﬀer depending on the involvement of formal
organisations within them. When their presence is central to the collective eﬀorts, they
play a role in moving information and resources across the networks. Thus, their absence
leaves an open question on whether bridging connections could emerge without them.
Hypotheses and Theoretical Models
Drawing on the closure and brokerage concepts set out above, we test four hypotheses
with regard to the structural features of online networks and how they relate to the
formation of social capital. We analyse the levels of closure and brokerage from a set of
online networks and compare them with both random simulations and the most common
theoretical models used to explain the formation of social networks. We use the outcome
from that exercise to test our four hypotheses.
The ﬁrst hypothesis is a baseline measure that aims to test whether the levels of
brokerage and closure we observe online are the product of purposive eﬀorts to interact, or
if they are indistinguishable from any other random network with the same number of
nodes and ties. Hence, we test the observed values we get from the online networks against
random graphs. Although it is likely that they will diﬀer, testing this hypothesis allows us
to move forward and make an informed decision on whether the networks present a basic
level of systematic social connections.
Hypothesis 1 The levels of bridging and bonding social capital formed through online
interactions are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than random.
To construct the random graphs, we use the ﬁrst variant of the Erdos-Renyi (ER)
model, G(n,M), which assumes that a graph is randomly selected from all the diﬀerent
16possibilities of graphs with a ﬁxed number of nodes n and vertices M. Each node in the
graph, then, has the same probability of being connected with any other node from the
same graph. We assigned the ﬁxed number of nodes and edges according to the observed
information. For this hypothesis we run two-sample t-tests to compare the diﬀerence in
means between the observed and the random networks.
Hypothesis 2 The networks formed through online interactions are, on average, less
dense and weaker than those generated by the theoretical models.
This hypothesis tests Putnam’s argument that online ties are not able to produce
social capital as face-to-face ties are. Since building counterfactuals to online networks is
an almost impossible task, we test the observed values we get from the online networks
against two theoretical models that are commonly used to explain social networks
formation: the Barabasi-Albert model, and the Watts-Strogatz model.
The Barabasi-Albert (BA) model is based on the notion of preferential attachment.
That is, it starts an initial random graph and creates new nodes, one at a time. The main
assumption is that nodes are more likely to connect with other nodes that are better
connected. The aim of this model is to account for the level of inﬂuence of certain nodes in
the network. Those who have more links, will attract more to connect with them. Formally,
the model starts with a network with m0 nodes. Each new node is connected to m ≤ m0
existing nodes with a probability that is proportional to the number of links that the
existing nodes already have. The probability pi that the new node is connected to node i is
pi =
ki
P
j kj
, (1)
where ki is the degree of node i and the sum is made over all pre-existing nodes j. Heavily
linked nodes tend to quickly accumulate even more links, while nodes with only a few links
are unlikely to be chosen as the destination for a new link. The new nodes have a
‘preference’ to attach themselves to the already heavily linked nodes.
17Finally, the Watts-Strogatz (WS) model overcomes two main criticisms of the ER
models. First, it accounts for the formation of triadic closure in a network — i.e. if we have
three nodes A,B and C, where there are strong ties between A and C, and A and B, it is
very likely that there will be a weak tie between B and C. Second, the degree distribution
of ER models form a Poisson distribution, since it does not assume that highly connected
nodes can link each other with higher likelihood. WS starts with a ﬁxed number of nodes
N connected with degree K (which needs to be an integer), each one connected in a
circular lattice with its neighbours. Then, the model rewires each one of the edges of a
node i with another node k with a probability β that each node will be selected. No
self-loops or duplicated edges are allowed. The main advantage of this model is that it
accounts for the small-world eﬀect (i.e. even if most nodes are not neighbours to each
other, they can be easily connected from every other with a small number of steps) by
producing higher levels of clustering coeﬃcient than the BA model. The BA model, on the
other hand, produces more realistic degree distributions.
The models use the information from the observed networks — such as the number of
edges and vertices, or the average degree — to build their own networks. For each model
(including the random graphs), we simulated a hundred diﬀerent random iterations of the
graphs and calculated their average values for closure and brokerage. We used the observed
graphs as a reference for the number of nodes and edges required for the calculation of the
models. For hypothesis 2, we compared the observed values against all the models.
Based on Putnam’s argument that online interactions are unsuitable for the
formation of social capital, our expectation is for the observed clustering coeﬃcient to be
lower and the network constraint to be higher than in the theoretical models. In particular,
we might expect cyberbalkanisation and the digital divide to restrict the formation of
social capital in the three online networks we consider.
We might expect tweets about the Occupy movement to be largely restricted to
18like-minded people, particularly those directly involved in it given the nature of protest
movements. The potential for cyberbalkanisation is particularly high for the IF Campaign.
Within the international development literature, it has been noted that levels of public
engagement (in the UK) with issues of global poverty and development are low and
declining (see Darnton & Kirk, 2011). As such, there is a high possibility that tweets about
the NGO-organised IF campaign are likely to be restricted to those already involved with
these NGOs, rather than across the public more generally. Similarly, we would expect
tweets about the Chilean Presidential election to take place among those that are already
more politically engaged, and may be restricted to those with similar political views.
In the case of the IF campaign and the Chilean Presidential elections, it is also
important to note that targeting social network sites are part of the campaign strategy
used by organizers. As such, much of the Twitter activity in these two networks is likely to
be driven by organizations and professional brokers, restricting network formation to being
concentrated around these brokers. As such, we would expect online network for the IF
campaign to be centred around the NGOs and NGO staﬀ members, rather than between
members of the general public. The same would apply to the online network for the Chilean
election campaign, which is likely to be constrained around political parties and activists.
Hypothesis 3 In online networks, bonding and bridging social capital operate in
coordination, strengthening each other.
To test this hypothesis, we used the observed values for each event and calculate their
correlation coeﬃcient, using both parametric (Pearson’s R) and non-parametrict (Kendall’s
tau) tests. We expect to observe positive co-variation between brokerage and closure. As
Putnam explains, both forms of social capital — bridging and bonding — should operate
in conjunction to produce a positive societal outcome. In empirical terms, that requires
that the presence of both should be related, but not working against each other.
19Hypothesis 4 In cases where organizations play a relevant role, we should expect higher
levels of bridging social capital in relation to the diﬀerent theoretical models.
Bennett and Segerberg (2013) have provided a solid theoretical framework about how
digital networking mechanisms embedded in the layers of networks can provide the means
of coordinating actions. There are two important points here that are relevant to our
analysis. First, communication within such networks can be thought of as an act of
organisation in technology-enabled networks. Second, a signature feature of this type of
communication is the increased personalization of action online; that is, a form of
engagement in which new media are used to carry personal stories and other content across
networks. However, not all networks are the same; it is indeed conceivable that diﬀerent
content is communicated — in a diﬀerent way and with diﬀerent organizational signatures
— across a network about an electoral campaign, a spontaneously organized demonstration
against bankers, and a well-organized protest march as part of an ongoing humanitarian
campaign.
Following Bennett and Sergerberg’s typology, and this general line of argument about
digitally networked action, we argue that social capital can be formed through
technology-enabled interactions and observed not only through analyzing tweets to detect
personalised action frames, but also at the structural level. The receipt, adaptation and
communication of personalized action frames that can be widely shared across diﬀerent
networks, and subsequently enable discussion and further involvement with a particular
campaign/cause, is likely to result in the development of social capital. However,
depending on the type of network examined, we expect that diﬀerent types of social capital
development will be more prominent in some networks than others. In this particular case,
we expect to ﬁnd more bridging social capital in networks where organizations play a more
central role.
The expected outcomes for each hypothesis are shown in Table 2.
20Data and Methods
We draw on Twitter data to test the four hypotheses set out above across three
diﬀerent cases: the Occupy Movement in the US (2011), the UK Enough Food for
Everyone ’IF’ global hunger campaign organised by UK-based NGOs to coincide with the
UK G8 meeting (2013) and the Chilean presidential elections (2013). The three cases have
been chosen using a ’diverse-case’ selection criteria around organizational presence. This
approach is a departure from previous analyses of Twitter data which have focused on
events similar in nature: for example the use of Twitter for protests (González-Bailón et
al., 2011); political campaigns (Vaccari et al., 2013); charitable campaigns (Clements, 2011)
or using the entire population of tweets for a certain time period (Morstatter et al., 2013).
Drawing on Bennett and Segerberg’s (2013) typology of collective action, the cases
(networks) represent one of three observed types: i) crowd-enabled connective action
network, ii) organizationally-brokered connective action network, and iii)
organizationally-enabled connective action network. Variation across the cases allows us to
test our hypotheses across both spatial and temporal domains, and because the observed
cases represent varying degrees of connective action, we can generalize ﬁndings here to the
wider population.
• OWS: Crowd-enabled connective action network. Previous research (Fábrega &
Sajuria, 2014; Conover, Ferrara, et al., 2013) has shown that this case is a prime
example of this type of political activism. OWs activists showed reluctance to allow
formal organizations to play a key role in the movement. Moreover, they emphazised
the role of technology as the means for connection, rather than membership to
organizations. This was to be expected from a public that was openly suspicious of
processes that require delegation and, hence, handing over individual empowerment
21to others; technology-enabled networks as a means of connection provided for them a
more neutral and self-empowering aﬃliation (Tufekci, 2014).
• IF Campaign: Organizationally-enabled connective action network. The IF campaign
was the ﬁrst campaign to be launched on Twitter by an umbrella group representing
over 200 NGOs. IF organizers continuously updated their hashtags and personalized
action frames based on central events, fulﬁlls all the requirement for an
organizationally-enabled connective action network.
• Chilean election: Organizationally-brokered collective action network. Like in most
traditional political campaigns, the Chilean election had a group of political parties
from each coalition seeking to mobilize people on Twitter towards their candidates.
Basically, they were organizations looking to magnify their support and membership.
The Occupy movement started in October 2011, after a group of protesters decided
to occupy Zucotti Park in New York. Their primary aim was to demonstrate against high
levels of inequality and the monetary system maintaining inequality. From that initial
occupation several occupations took place across the US and beyond. The data for Occupy
was obtained through the Occupy Research project (www.occupyresearch.net), a
collaborative network of researchers interested in the Occupy movement. The were gathered
by R-Shief (www.R-shief.org) using the Twitter Streaming API for a period of 13 weeks,
following the onset of the movement on October 2011. The data contain tweets using the
diﬀerent hashtags related to the movement, in particular those referring to cities where
occupations took place. We focus on all tweets using the ’oﬃcial’ hashtag of the movement
(#ows; N= 4,352,071 tweets). The emphasis on hashtags is not without question. Focusing
on them allows us to observe only those who had a minimal level of involvement in the
discussions about the Occupy movement. Whereas the use of hashtags relates to a
particular group of users, those who use them are those who we especially target.
22The IF campaign was a coalition of over 200 UK NGOs seeking to put pressure on
the G8 governments meeting in the UK in the summer of 2013. The campaign’s focus was
on global hunger and sought to get the G8 leaders to make commitments to tackle four
underlying drivers of malnutrition – insuﬃcient aid and investment, the problem of land
grabs, the failure to tax multinational companies, and a lack of transparency around deals
and investment. The data from the IF Campaign were gathered using DiscoverText
(www.discovertext.com), from 23 January to 16 October, the oﬃcial start and end dates
of the campaign, using the live feed API. We collected tweets that contained the oﬃcial
hashtags used by the campaign (e.g. #IF, #IFCampaign, #BigIF, #BigIFLondon,
#BigIFBelfast). Given the large number of coalition members we decided to collect tweets
using the hashtags of campaign as a whole rather than the many organisational twitter
handles. We anticipated that this would allow us to gather all campaign-related tweeting,
both from the oﬃcial campaign, member organisations, and discussion by the public. The
oﬃcial hashtags were provided in advance by the campaign. Because the main hashtag —
#IF — was widely used for non-campaign tweeting we unavoidably collected a high number
of non-campaign related tweets. As such the data were cleaned using DiscoverText’s built
in machine classiﬁer (a naïve Bayesian classiﬁer) resulting in a total of 101,842 units.
The data for the Chilean election were obtained through the Analitic platform
(www.analitic.cl), which uses the Twitter “Gardenhose” API. We collected the tweets
related to the two main candidates for this election, Michelle Bachelet and Evelyn Matthei.
The tweets were selected based on the use of the name of the candidates, either as a
mention, in hashtags containing the names, or their names without an "@" at the
beginning. This approach, unlike using hashtags, has been shown to be more appropriate
for the analysis of tweets during election campaigns (DiGrazia et al., 2013). The time
period spanned from 7 weeks before the run-oﬀ election until December 17 2013, which
covered the entire legal campaign period for both rounds (N= 1,556,109 tweets).
23The datasets2 were ﬁltered, leaving the username of the sender, the date of the tweet
and any corresponding text. Each dataset was then divided into weekly static networks,
creating a list of all usernames contained within the text of the tweets. An edge list was
created using the username of the sender, and assigning a directed edge to any other
usernames mentioned in their tweets. In order to account for more stable relationships
among users, we ﬁltered out any edges (ties) with a degree less than two. Descriptive
statistics for each dataset is presented in Table 3.
Measures. To assess the level of closure for each network, we used the average
local clustering coeﬃcient metric. This value, for each weekly network, was calculated
using an algorithm (Watts & Strogatz, 1998) that determines how close a node and its
neighbours are to becoming a clique (a graph of fully connected nodes). Any graph
G = (V,E) formally consists of a set of vertices V and a set of edges E between them. An
edge eij connects vertex vi with vertex vj. The neighbourhood Ni for a vertex vi is deﬁned
as its immediately connected neighbours as follows:
Ni = {vj : eij ∈ E ∧ eji ∈ E}. (2)
Let ki be the number of vertices, |Ni|, in the neighbourhood, Ni, of a vertex. The
local clustering coeﬃcient Ti for a vertex vi is then given by the proportion of links
between the vertices within its neighborhood divided by the number of links that could
possibly exist between them. For a directed graph, eij is distinct from eji, and therefore for
each neighborhood Ni there are ki(ki − 1) links that could exist among the vertices within
the neighborhood. Thus, the local clustering coeﬃcient for directed graphs is given as
Ti =
|{ejk : vj,vk ∈ Ni,ejk ∈ E}|
ki(ki − 1)
. (3)
2Each dataset contains the text of the tweet, date and time, the user who sent it (username and user
identiﬁcation number), and relevant metadata, such as location and the proﬁle image of the sender.
24From this, we can calculate the average local clustering coeﬃcient for all the vertices
n:
¯ T =
1
n
n X
i=1
Ti. (4)
To calculate brokerage, we use Burt’s Network Constraint Index (2005) which
measures the lack of structural holes within a network. A structural hole exists where two
groups in a network are unconnected. The ability to bridge a structural hole bestows power
on an actor in a network because they can valuably control and broker the ﬂow of
information between the two groups. Constraint is deﬁned as a situation where an actor
does not have access to structural holes and so cannot beneﬁt from exploiting a brokerage
position. To get at this, Burt’s measure focuses on how much the connections of node i are
concentrated in a single group of interconnected nodes, which in turn constrain i’s ability
to bridge across groups. This can be expressed as follows,
Ci = Σcij,i 6= j (5)
where Ci is the network constraint of i, and cij refers to the dependence of i on j,
cij = (pij + Σqpiqpqj)
2,i 6= q 6= j, (6)
where pijis the proportion of i0s connections are invested in node j, so that
pij =
zij
Σqziq. Here, zij is the measure of the strength of the association between i and j, so
the constraint of each individual level goes from 0 to 1, depending on whether i’s
connections are invested in j.
Network constraint, as the sum of cij across all i’s connections, provides a measure on
how much i is limited by their own network in accessing new information coming from
other groups (which needs to cross over a structural hole). Therefore, constraint will vary
25according to the size, hierarchy, and density of i’s network. Constraint is higher when
someone has fewer connections that are highly interconnected to each other. The level of
interconnection can happen directly (pij) between the members of i’s network — in a dense
network — or indirectly (Σqpiqpqj) through a single node — like in a hierarchical network.
Our networks, in particular, do not present a theoretical hierarchy, due to the horizontal
nature of the interactions. Unlike work environments — the original setting for Burt’s work
— our cases are less likely to present hierarchical structures. To calculate brokerage, we
average the node-speciﬁc constraint Ci across the networks to obtain ¯ C.
Both metrics — clustering coeﬃcient and network constraint — are good indicators
of closure and brokerage. In summary, a higher value on clustering coeﬃcient indicates a
higher level closure, a lower network constraint values indicate higher levels of brokerage.
Previous ﬁndings (Burt, 2000, 2005) show that both measures are associated with higher
levels of individual social capital.
Results and Discussion
Figures 1 and 2 show the development of closure and brokerage over time for each
network. Figure 1 shows closure, week by week, in comparison with the diﬀerent
theoretical models. The data shows that the levels of closure are higher (slightly) for the
observed networks than for any of the models, in each of the three datasets. That is, given
the number of edges, vertices, and the average degree of the networks, none of the
simulated models are able to create higher levels of closure. This ﬁnding partially supports
H2, by showing that online networks seem to be more eﬃcient in forming small, denser
communities than what theory would expect. This suggests that online networks are able
to produce bonding social capital and their levels of closure are not explained simply by
random allocation of nodes and ties.
In the case of network constraint (Figure 1), the support for H2 is also only partial.
26None of the observed networks are able to produce higher levels of brokerage than the
theoretical models. Moreover, in the case of Occupy, the levels of brokerage are even lower
than the random graphs. In the case of the IF campaign and the Chilean election,
brokerage was consistently above the random models, which shows that the connections
across structural holes present in these networks are higher than we would expect on any
random network.
Two points warrant further consideration. First, the presence of brokerage
opportunities is lower in online networks than the theoretical expectations, and the ability
of members’ of the networks to connect groups across structural holes is less eﬃcient that
what we would expect. Second, the diﬀerence between the OWS movement and the other
cases raises questions about the nature of the events and whether diﬀerences in the
presence of organisations may explain the diﬀerential ﬁndings with respect to brokerage.
On top of what we have anticipated in H4, one of the potential reasons for this diﬀerence is
that the Occupy case is less constrained in two particular aspects: geography and scope of
issues. As has been described by the literature (Conover, Davis, et al., 2013), the Occupy
Movement reached places beyond the USA, but was highly concentrated on local events in
each city. Moreover, the issues raised by the demonstrators ranged from the (rather vague)
claim for more equality, to more concrete topics (e.g. the change in the ﬁnancial system)
depending on the place of the occupation (Chomsky, 2012; Castells, 2012). For these
reasons, we performed a second set of analyses on the Occupy case.
Using the data from two cities in the US — Oakland and Boston — we calculated the
levels of brokerage for each network and compared it with the simulated networks (using
hashtags #OccupyOakland and #OccupyBoston respectively). The aim of this analysis is
to establish whether the trend of low brokerage is something inherent to the Occupy
movement, or was simply less evident in the wider, (inter)national network given its diﬀuse
set of issue concerns and sizeable geographic constituency. We expect that the Oakland
27and Boston chapters of Occupy will show higher levels of brokerage (in relative terms) than
the broad-based Occupy/#OWS.
Figure 3 shows the results for both networks. In the case of Boston, the trend was
exactly the same as in the OWS networks: brokerage was lower than any of the theoretical
models, including the random simulations. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant and is
consistent with the results from the general Occupy movement. The case of Oakland, on
the other hand, shows more disparate results. The results remain diﬀerent at a p<0.05
level, which means that the observed values diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the simulations,
however, the results show no clear trend over time. The observed networks show, at points,
even higher levels of brokerage than most of the models (with the exception of
Watts-Strogatz), and during other weeks the brokerage is lower than the simulations.
Looking at the results more closely, the weeks where brokerage is lower are those
where the number of edges is higher. This is consistent with the idea that more ties within
a limited network will eventually work against the existence of structural holes.
Nevertheless, this does not answer the question of why the levels of brokerage are
consistently lower in the other Occupy datasets, but not in this one3. After accounting for
geographical conditions, we believe that these results support hypothesis 4, that is, that
organizations play a key role in fostering brokerage in collective action networks.
In summary, we ﬁnd only partial support for H2 with respect to closure: online
networks are able to foster the creation of tight, small groups within the network and do so
better than what would be predicted if random. With respect to brokerage, the story is
twofold. On the one hand, the IF campaign and the Chilean election networks show similar
results (as in closure), whereas the OWS networks do not show any more brokerage than
3As a plausible explanation, we could argue that Occupy movements radicalised in smaller, not main-
stream cities, might beneﬁt from more local, oﬄine organisation. Hence, the levels of brokerage might look
more dynamic and higher
28what we might expect at random. In the case of the Occupy, this result was tested with
smaller groups within the Occupy movement, but with disparate results.
Our results showing diﬀerences in brokerage between OWS and the other two cases
warrants further consideration. Beyond the more technical inferences about the diﬀering
results, we argue that that OWS may diﬀer substantively from the other two cases. Both
the Chilean election and the IF campaign are highly organised, well-funded and tightly
focused events. Given that the main aim of campaign communications, Twitter or
otherwise, is to inﬂuence attitudes, preferences or vote choice, we would expect to see a
higher number of organizations hiring ’professional brokers’, i.e. people whose main job it
is to connect the diﬀerent supporters of a given candidate, transmit information from the
campaigns, and engage potential supporters. Moreover, the election itself was narrow in
focus with two main events: the ﬁrst round and the run-oﬀ election. This means that the
professional brokers not only had a goal, but also a deadline, to focus their resources and
eﬀorts. Similarly, IF was a coordinated campaign focusing on a small number of key events
and issues. Each of the participating organisations, though varied in their level of
resources, may have served as professional brokers whose primary aim was engaging the
sector and the broader public, by transmitting relevant information across them.
On the other hand, the OWS movement was more organic in its origins. The
demonstrators themselves tried to foster the idea of a ’leaderless revolution’ and aimed to
keep momentum for a long period of time. There were few singular events that served to
focus their resources and activities and the way in which they organised, both locally and
globally, was explicitly designed to foster egalitarian and horizontal interactions. Analysed
at a more local scale, the results from the Occupy show diﬀerent patterns. While in some
cases the trend was similar to the aggregate movement, in other cases, local networks show
higher levels of coordination and inter-group interaction. After accounting for geographical
conditions, we believe that these results support H4, that is, organizations play a key role
29in fostering brokerage in collective action networks.
To test our ﬁrst hypothesis, that the three observed networks are diﬀerent from
random, we compared the mean scores for closure and brokerage for the random
simulations against each network. The results — in Appendix A — show that in most
cases, the diﬀerence between observed and random networks is not due to chance,
providing strong support for H1.
For H3, the results are consistent with our expectations. In all three events analysed,
the correlation between brokerage and closure is positive4. The detailed results can be
found in Appendix B, along with ﬁgures for each of the networks. We used both
parametric (Pearson’s R) and non-parametric (Kendall’s τ) measures of association to test
the hypothesis. In summary, brokerage and closure appear to be positively correlated in all
three cases, although it becomes weaker in the case of the OWS dataset, mainly for the
above discussed reasons.
The ﬁndings from the OWS, the IF campaign and the Chilean election provide a
compelling account of the formation of social capital online. The three cases show patterns
of behaviour that cannot be explained fully by the most widely used theoretical models nor
respond to mere random allocation of nodes and ties. In sum, the data suggest evidence of
social capital formation online.
Conclusions
In this article we have provided initial evidence of the formation of social capital in
online networks. We return to Putnam’s concepts of bonding and bridging social capital in
reviewing our ﬁndings. With regard to bonding social capital, online interactions appear to
bring together like-minded people, and create small, dense groups among them. That is,
4As explained above, the way in which network constraint is measured is such that higher levels of
brokerage is expressed in lower levels of network constraint. For that reason, we use 1 − ¯ C.
30the potential of ICTs to create bonding social capital is better than of the theoretical
models. On the positive side, this means that online networks may have more potential
than we expected to foster the creation of trust and reciprocity, based on the idea of
intra-group ties. However, this may also lead to what Putnam calls "cyberbalkanisation",
keeping like-minded people together, and not allowing the members of the groups to be
exposed to more diverse information, while excluding those outside of them.
In terms of the bridging social capital, the results are conditional. It seems that the
presence of organizations and professional brokers in the networks allows for bridging
across structural holes. That is, the formation of bridging social capital seems possible by
the presence of people whose aim is to produce those ties. The connection between small
groups does not occur randomly or organically. In essence, this is not much diﬀerent that
what we would expect according to Bennett and Sergerberg’s typology. The alleged
horizontal and spontaneous nature of online interactions might not be enough to produce,
without intention, bridging social capital. Moreover, these results support Gibson &
McAllister’s ﬁndings about the prevalence of bonding over bridging social capital in online
environments. Our tests using observational networks — instead of self-reported data —
provides an "acid test" for the veracity of their conclusions.
Putnam also claims that healthy societies foster the formation of both bonding and
bridging social capital in coordination. One is required for the presence and operation of
the other, and as such, the interplay between them creates trust, appreciation for diversity,
and communication among diﬀerent social groups. Our results show that online interactions
are able to produce the same positive interplay. Furthermore, the evidence presented also
provides support to the idea that this positive interplay requires intentionality. Online
social capital seems to be in the right direction, allowing and fostering the coordination
between bridging and bonding social capital. However, this is also present in events where
part of the ethos of the network is the communication across people from diﬀerent groups.
31We have focused our attention here on the online social architecture, the networks of
twitter connections and conversations, to test whether we observe evidence for patterns of
bridging and bonding social capital. One thing we have not tested is whether the content
of the conversations and connections provide evidence for social capital in the sense of
building trust and norms. This, in our view, is the clearest and most pressing area for
future research. There is an important distinction between the thinner, transactional view
of connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2013) and the thicker, transformational view of
social capital. The crucial next step is to understand if, when, where, and how connections
beget positive social externalities and help form the ‘social glue’ of Putnam (2001). In this
light, we see our more modest and structural contribution here as a necessary ﬁrst step in
this endeavor. Because social capital cannot exist in ‘the ether’ but requires social bonds –
online or oﬄine – we argue that we have provided the necessary, but not suﬃcient, ﬁrst
step in understanding whether social capital exists in online networks.
This paper has attempted to provide a preliminary approach to the formation of
social capital in online contexts, by analysing three diﬀerent Twitter datasets. Our ﬁndings
suggest that the current theoretical expectations of how social connections are created and
maintained are not able to explain the network structure of online social interactions.
Furthermore, on the question of the existence of social capital in online settings, we fall on
the side of caution. Online connections seem able to easily create bonding social capital,
but they require a concentrated eﬀort to create bridges across those groups. The ideal
setting presented by Putnam, where bonding and bridging social capital operate in
conjunction, requires intention and eﬀort.
32References
Appel, L., Dadlani, P., Dwyer, M., Hampton, K., Kitzie, V., Matni, Z. A., ... Teodoro, R.
(2014). Testing the validity of social capital measures in the study of information and
communication technologies. Information, Communication & Society, 17(4), 398–416.
Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2013). The logic of connective action: Digital media and
the personalization of contentious politics. Cambridge University Press.
Bimber, B., Flanagin, A., & Stohl, C. (2012). Collective action in organizations:
Interaction and engagement in an era of technological change. Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Bond, R. M., Fariss, C. J., Jones, J. J., Kramer, A. D. I., Marlow, C., Settle, J. E., &
Fowler, J. H. (2012). A 61-million-person experiment in social inﬂuence and political
mobilization. Nature, 489(7415), 295–298.
Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In Handbook of theory and research for the
sociology of education (pp. 241–58). New York: Greenwood Press.
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002). Social capital and community governance. The Economic
Journal, 112(483), F419–F436.
Brundidge, J., & Rice, R. (n.d.). Political engagement online. do information rich get
richer and the like-minded more similar. In Routledge handbook of internet politics (pp.
144–156). Taylor & Francis.
Burt, R. (2000). The network structure of social capital. Research in Organizational
Behavior, 22, 345–423.
Burt, R. (2005). Brokerage and closure: An introduction to social capital. Oxford
University Press, USA.
33Castells, M. (2012). Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the internet age.
Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Chomsky, N. (2012). Occupy. London: Penguin.
Christakis, N. A., & Fowler, J. H. (2011). Connected: The surprising power of our social
networks and how they shape our lives – how your friends’ friends’ friends aﬀect
everything you feel, think, and do (Reprint ed.). London: Back Bay Books.
Claridge, T. (2004). Social capital and natural resource management (Unpublished
doctoral dissertation). University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.
Clements, K. (2011). Social media–the twilight years of fundraising. BMJ Supportive &
Palliative Care, 1(2), 252–252.
Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. The American
Journal of Sociology, 94, S95–S120.
Colletta, N. J., & Cullen, M. L. (2000). Violent conﬂict and the transformation of social
capital: lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia. World Bank
Publications.
Conover, M. D., Davis, C., Ferrara, E., McKelvey, K., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2013,
March). The geospatial characteristics of a social movement communication network.
PLoS ONE, 8(3), e55957.
Conover, M. D., Ferrara, E., Menczer, F., & Flammini, A. (2013). The digital evolution of
Occupy Wall Street. PLoS ONE, 8(5), e64679.
Darnton, A., & Kirk, M. (2011). Finding frames: New ways to engage the uk public in
global poverty. Bond.
34de Tocqueville, A. (2006). Democracy in America. Echo Library.
DiGrazia, J., McKelvey, K., Bollen, J., & Rojas, F. (2013). More tweets, more votes:
Social media as a quantitative indicator of political Behavior. PloS ONE, 8(11), e79449.
Ellison, N., Steinﬁeld, C., & Lampe, C. (2006). The beneﬁts of Facebook "friends": Social
capital and college students’ use of online social network sites. Journal of Computer
Mediated Communication, 12(1), 1143–1168.
Ellison, N., Steinﬁeld, C., & Lampe, C. (2011). Connection strategies: Social capital
implications of Facebook-enabled communication practices. New Media & Society,
13(6), 873–892.
Fábrega, J., & Sajuria, J. (2014). The emergence of political discourse on digital networks:
The case of the occupy movement. International J. of Organisational Design and
Engineering, 3(3/4), 210-222.
Gibson, R. K., Howard, P. N., & Ward, S. J. (2000). Social capital, internet connectedness
and political participation: A four-country study. In International Political Science
Association meeting, Quebec, Canada.
Gibson, R. K., & McAllister, I. (2013). Online social ties and political engagement.
Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 10(1), 21–34.
González-Bailón, S., Borge-Holthoefer, J., Rivero, A., & Moreno, Y. (2011). The dynamics
of protest recruitment through an online network. Scientiﬁc Reports, 1.
Granovetter, M. S. (1973). The strength of weak ties. The American Journal of Sociology,
78(6), 1360–1380.
Hanifan, L. J. (1920). The community center. Boston: Nabu Press.
35Hooghe, M., & Stolle, D. (2003). Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in
comparative perspective. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Judge, S., Puckett, K., & Bell, S. M. (2006). Closing the digital divide: Update from the
early childhood longitudinal study. The Journal of Educational Research, 100(1), 52-60.
Kavanaugh, A. L., & Patterson, S. J. (2001). The impact of community computer
networks on social capital and community involvement. American Behavioral Scientist,
45, 469–509.
Kwon, M.-W., D’Angelo, J., & McLeod, D. M. (2013). Facebook use and social capital to
bond, to bridge, or to escape. Bulletin of Science Technology & Society, 33(1-2), 35–43.
Lin, N. (2008). A network theory of social capital. In The handbook of social capital.
Oxford University Press, USA.
Margetts, H., John, P., Escher, T., & Reissfelder, S. (2011). Social information and
political participation on the internet: An experiment. European Political Science
Review, 3(03), 321–344.
McAdam, D. (1990). Freedom summer. Oxford University Press.
McCallister, L., & Fischer, C. S. (1978). A procedure for surveying personal networks.
Sociological Methods & Research, 7(2), 131–148.
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A
partial theory. American Journal of Sociology, 1212–1241.
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., & Cook, J. M. (2001). Birds of a feather: Homophily in
social networks. Annual Review of Sociology, 415–444.
Morozov, E. (2011). The Net Delusion: How not to liberate the world. London: Penguin.
36Morstatter, F., Pfeﬀer, J., Liu, H., & Carley, K. M. (2013). Is the sample good enough?
comparing data from twitter’s streaming api with twitter’s ﬁrehose. Proceedings of
ICWSM.
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. public goods and the theory of groups.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pinchotti, S., & Verwimp, P. (2007). Social capital and the Rwandan genocide, a
micro-level analysis. Brighton.
Portes, A. (1998). Social capital: Its origins and applications in modern sociology. Annual
Review of Sociology, 24, 1–24.
Putnam, R. (1994). Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Putnam, R. (2001). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. New
York: Simon & Schuster Ltd.
Rainie, L., & Smith, A. (2012). Social networking sites and politics (Vol. 12; Tech. Rep.).
Pew Internet & American Life Project.
Shah, D. V., Kwak, N., & Holbert, L. (2001). "Connecting" and "Disconnecting" with civic
life: Patterns of internet use and the production of social capital. Political
Communication, 18(2), 141–162.
Shen, C., Monge, P., & Williams, D. (2014). Virtual brokerage and closure: Network
structure and social capital in a massively multiplayer online game. Communication
Research, 41(4), 459-480.
Sobel, J. (2002). Can we trust social capital? Journal of Economic Literature, 40,
139–154.
37Tufekci, Z. (2014). The medium and the movement: Digital tools, social movement
politics, and the end of the free rider problem. Policy Internet, 6(2), 202–208.
Tzanakis, M. (2013). Social capital in Bourdieu’s, Coleman’s and Putnam’s theory:
Empirical evidence and emergent measurement issues. Educate, 13(2), 2–23.
Vaccari, C., Valeriani, A., Barberá, P., Bonneau, R., Jost, J. T., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J.
(2013). Social media and political communication. a survey of twitter users during the
2013 italian general election. Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 43(3), 381–410.
Van Der Gaag, M., & Snijders, T. (2005). The resource generator: social capital
quantiﬁcation with concrete items. Social Networks, 27(1), 1–29.
Ward, S., & Gibson, R. (2009). European political organizations and the internet:
Mobilization, participation, and change. In Routledge handbook of internet politics (pp.
25–39).
Watts, D., & Strogatz, S. (1998). Collective dynamics of a "small world" networks. Nature,
393, 440–442.
Webber, M. P. (2008). Access to social capital and the course of depression: A prospective
study (PhD Thesis). King’s College London, London.
Wellman, B., Haase, A., Witte, J., & Hampton, K. (2001, November). Does the internet
increase, decrease, or supplement social capital?: Social networks, participation, and
community commitment. American Behavioral Scientist, 45(3), 436–455.
Williams, D. (2006). On and Oﬀ the net: Scales for social capital in an online era. Journal
of Computer-Mediated Communication, 11(2), 593–628.
Yardi, S., & boyd, D. (2010). Dynamic debates: an analysis of group polarization over
time on Twitter. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 30(5), 316–327.
38Table 1
Distinction between neo-capital and communitarian approaches in terms of the type of ties
within a network
Focus Intra-group ties Inter-group ties
Neo-capitalist approach Individual advantage of a person in a network Closure Brokerage
Communitarian approach Aggregate beneﬁts of networks Bonding Social Capital Bridging social capital
39Table 2
Hypothesis and expected outcomes
Hypothesis Indicator Expected outcome
H1. Observed networks are
diﬀerent than random.
Average local clustering co-
eﬃcient and network con-
straint (t-tests)
6=
H2. Observed bridging and
bonding social capital are
lower than the theoretical
models
Average local clustering co-
eﬃcient and network con-
straint
< clustering coeﬃcient, >
network constraint
H3. Closure and brokerage
work in cooperation
Correlation coeﬃcient
(Pearson and Kendall)
+
H4. Bridging social capital
is higher in organizations-
led networks
Average local clustering co-
eﬃcient
> in organization-led net-
works in relation to the the-
oretical models, and com-
pared to the othr cases
40Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
IF Campaign OWS Chilean Election
Week Vertices Edges Vertices Edges Vertices Edges
1 3334 478 40223 28480 94768 30682
2 3333 478 69799 86308 45156 9606
3 1660 220 42747 23483 87220 16445
4 1514 266 47067 36721 83333 13607
5 1221 162 60323 71216 34261 6372
6 1363 118 42168 28564 37450 9287
7 2637 284 30793 16289 68499 18115
8 3617 711 45118 35314
9 2176 239 63185 86258
10 380 31 53687 46380
11 932 70 47361 36027
12 932 70 41153 31683
13 1028 124 25874 11585
14 1946 111
15 1053 116
16 2469 255
17 1677 523
18 1504 190
19 4146 728
20 12532 3481
21 4813 1135
22 347 7
41TWEETING ALONE? 42
Figure 1. Closure for the three networks (The lines are ﬁtted using a local polynomial regression
ﬁtting, with α = 0.5)TWEETING ALONE? 43
Figure 2. Brokerage for the three networks (The lines are ﬁtted using a local polynomial regression
ﬁtting, with α = 0.5)TWEETING ALONE? 44
Figure 3. Brokerage for Oakland and Boston (The lines are ﬁtted using a local polynomial
regression ﬁtting, with α = 0.5)Appendix A
T-tests
The results, shown in Tables B1-B3, present strong evidence in support of H1. In nearly
every instance, the means for closure and brokerage are statistically diﬀerent between the
observed networks and the models (p<.01). However, in a few cases, the statistical tests do
not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. The calculation of closure for weeks 10-13 for the
IF campaign using the BA algorithm are not statistically diﬀerent. However, this time
interval coincides with the period in which the number of tweets is the smallest for the
whole series, and consequently, the size of the networks is also much smaller. Since BA
models are calculated based on the count of vertices from the observed models, this may
well explain the lack of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the theoretical model and observed
networks. In substantive terms, these results show that the Barabasi-Albert and
Watts-Strogatz theoretical models, in the way we simulate them, are not able to replicate
the same levels of brokerage and closure of our observed networks. Furthermore, the
particular networks created by the Twitter conversations diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the
random models simulated for this study.
45Appendix B
Correlations
In the case of the IF campaign, the Pearson coeﬃcient is 0.48, and Kendall’s τ is 0.32. In
the case of the Chilean election Pearson’s R is 0.80 and Kendall’s τ goes up to 0.62. The
OWS dataset shows a signiﬁcantly lower degree of correlation (R= 0.09, τ=0), however this
is to be expected given the results from H2. On a related note, the diﬀerence in the results
for the OWS networks also provide an interesting test for the overall validity of our
ﬁndings. One of the most common criticisms of network analysis is that the metrics used
to observe the networks seem to account for the same phenomena from diﬀerent angles. As
such, high levels of correlation are not only expected, but would also provide evidence in
support of that theory. Contrary to our expectation, the levels of brokerage and closure in
the case of the OWS seem not to be correlated at all, which deﬁes the notion that the
metrics are not providing new information. This, in turn, supports to the idea that closure
and brokerage, while related, are diﬀerent theoretical and empirical concepts.
Figure B1 shows the scatterplots for each network, with linear and polynomial
ﬁttings.
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Figure B1. (The grey lines are ﬁtted using a local polynomial regression ﬁtting, with α = 0.5)
47Table B1
P-values from t-tests using observed values against models - OWS
Brokerage Closure
Network Constraint Avg. Clustering Coeﬃcient
Week Barabasi Random Watts Barabasi Random Watts
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
11 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
12 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
48Table B2
P-values from t-tests using observed values against models - IF Campaign
Brokerage Closure
Network Constraint Avg. Clustering Coeﬃcient
Week Barabasi Random Watts Barabasi Random Watts
1 0.000 0.750 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
9 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.640 0.000 0.000
11 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.860 0.000 0.000
12 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.950 0.000 0.000
13 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.000
14 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
16 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
17 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
18 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
19 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
20 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
21 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
22 0.000 0.240 0.000 0.000 0.160 0.800
49Table B3
P-values from t-tests using observed values against models - Chilean Election
Brokerage Closure
Network Constraint Avg. Clustering Coeﬃcient
Week Barabasi Random Watts Barabasi Random Watts
1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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